

UNDERSTANDING THE DAM BASICS: THE ROLE OF THE STRUCTURAL ENGINEER IN CONCRETE DAMS

Presented by:

Aimee Corn, PE



Before we begin... let's play a little trivia!



**What
state
has the
most
dams?**





**What
state
has the
most
dams?**

- #1 Texas (7,384)**
- #2 Kansas (6,427)**
- #3 Mississippi (6,093)**
- #4 Georgia (5,416)**
- #5 Missouri (5,400)**

**What
state
has the
fewest
number
of
dams?**






**What
state
has the
fewest
number
of
dams?**

**#50 Delaware (83)
#49 Alaska (111)
#48 Hawaii (127)
#47 Rhode Island (235)
#46 Vermont (371)**

**What state
produces the
most
hydropower?**







**What state
produces the
most
hydropower?**

- #1 Washington**
- #2 Oregon**
- #3 New York**
- #4 California**
- #5 Montana**

**What was the
original name
of Hoover
Dam?**






**What was the
original name
of Hoover
Dam?**

**Boulder
Dam**

**What is the
largest
hydropower
producing
dam in the
United
States?**







**What is the
largest
hydropower
producing
dam in the
United
States?**

- #1 Grand Coulee (6,180 MW; Columbia)**
- #2 Chief Joseph (2,620 MW; Columbia)**
- #3 Niagara Falls (2,515 MW; Niagara)**
- #4 Hoover Dam (2,080 MW; Colorado)**

**What year
was the
oldest dam in
the United
States
completed?**






**What year
was the
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
1640


LET'S BEGIN...

- ❑ Dams – The Big Picture
- ❑ Previous Dam Failures
- ❑ How and for what are dams analyzed?
- ❑ Basic Concrete Dam Failure Modes
- ❑ Analysis Options
- ❑ Examples
- ❑ A few last things
- ❑ Questions




DAMS: THE BIG PICTURE







KANSAS



UNITED STATES

LAWRENCE



2021
REPORT CARD
FOR AMERICA'S INFRASTRUCTURE



America's
Infrastructure
Scores a
C-


D
DAMS

DAMS: THE BIG PICTURE


DAM HAZARD POTENTIAL CLASSIFICATION	LOW HAZARD POTENTIAL	SIGNIFICANT HAZARD POTENTIAL	HIGH HAZARD POTENTIAL
LOSS OF HUMAN LIFE	None Expected	None Expected	Probable
ECONOMIC LOSSES	Low and generally limited to owner	Yes	Yes (<i>but not necessary for this classification</i>)
ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGES	Low and generally limited to owner	Yes	Yes (<i>but not necessary for this classification</i>)
LIFELINE INTERESTS IMPACTED	No	Yes	Yes (<i>but not necessary for this classification</i>)

Adapted from the National Inventory of Dams

DAMS: THE BIG PICTURE




DAMS BY HAZARD POTENTIAL




DAMS: THE BIG PICTURE

DAMS BY COMPLETION DATE




DAMS: THE BIG PICTURE

DAMS BY COMPLETION DATE




AVERAGE YEAR OF COMPLETION




DAMS: THE BIG PICTURE

DAMS BY COMPLETION DATE




AVERAGE YEAR OF COMPLETION



DAMS: THE BIG PICTURE



GRAVITY



Understanding the Dam Basics:
The role of the structural engineer in Concrete Dams


DAMS: THE BIG PICTURE

ARCH



DAMS: THE BIG PICTURE


SLAB AND BUTTRESS




Understanding the Dam Basics:
The role of the structural engineer in Concrete Dams

DAMS: THE BIG PICTURE

EMBANKMENT




DAMS: THE BIG PICTURE



DAMS: THE BIG PICTURE



RESERVOIR



ANATOMY OF A DAM



PREVIOUS DAM FAILURES

Equal Rights

Liberty Under

True Industrial Freedom



Vol. XLVII

WEDNESDAY MORNING, MARCH 14, 1928.

DAILY, FIVE CENTS

SUNDAY, TEN CENTS

200 DEAD, 30 MISSING, \$7,000,000 LOSS IN ST. FRANCIS DAM DISASTER



PREVIOUS DAM FAILURES: ST. FRANCIS

Location: California

Completed: 1926

Failure: March 12, 1928


Deaths: 470

- Designed with no oversight
- Exempt from 1917 Dam Safety



PREVIOUS DAM FAILURES: ST. FRANCIS

- Left abutment unknowingly constructed on massive mega-paleo-landslide.
- Uplift pressure led to movement causing foundation failure and imminent dam failure.



Nuss, 2015

PREVIOUS DAM FAILURES: ST. FRANCIS

Outcomes:

- Comprehensive oversight by the California Division of Dam Safety
- Required Professional Engineering Licensing
- Independent peer review of new designs including Geologic assessments
- All Federal and California dams higher than 50 feet were reviewed

Significant drop in concrete dam failures after 1929



<https://damfailures.org/case-study/st-francis-dam-california-1928/>

La DC salva Bonomi

PCI e PSI votano insieme

A pagina 7

L'Unità

ORGANO DEL PARTITO COMUNISTA ITALIANO

L'Unità processata
perchè denunciò
il pericolo della diga

La tragedia del Vaiont

Sono migliaia i morti È una strage che si poteva evitare!

Responsabilità

UNA INCALZATA sismica, l'impetuosa
discesa di blocchi, non si è accesa in grado di fare
alcuna un'ammirabile salvezza del borgo e dei
villaggi vicini, non una rimozione, delle due
villaggi distrutti. Il evento però si potesse evitare
se non per l'inevitabile, perché di fatto erano stati
in loco l'istesso già, l'istesso nelle loro delide, perché
non sono stati in grado di farli e di evitarli.
Ragioni di fatto e tanta tragedia e a tutti tutti
responsabili che la tragedia non si potesse evitare
e quindi a nessuno non possono non attribuirsi di
colpevole, una responsabilità concreta del fatto
che non solo non sono stati in grado di farli
evitare ma che il disastro colpiva una parte della
comunità italiana, un evento della natura
della di fatto dell'evento è più grave e la tragedia
e i benefici della verità pubblica appaiono a
tutti come un fenomeno tragico.

Una catastrofe naturale e questi sentimenti e
a questi disastri naturali e naturali. Per
quanto riguarda la verità non era da tempo però
si erano di arrivare presto all'appuntamento
con la verità dell'evento. Con come è arrivato
in ogni parte, dimostrando che tutta la piazza
la tragedia internazionale della tragedia e dei morti
responsabili — del fatto del — per
investigare le forze della natura, questo perché
la cosa possibile della circostanza di Pinerolo e
le attività calcolate e per essere la soluzione
della verità di eventi imprevedibili, l'indagine
del fenomeno dell'evento. Un'indagine che si
potrebbe una responsabilità, il disastro di fatto
potrebbe di fatto per la tragedia internazionale e
la verità internazionale della verità e della tragedia
e per l'evento internazionale, responsabilità e
per l'evento internazionale, la soluzione della
questo internazionale della verità e della tragedia
della natura e che attribuiscono una responsabilità
tutta la parte dell'evento.



CONDAGNONE — Un disastroso campo della distruzione causata dalla massa d'acqua precipitata a valle della diga del Vaiont.

THE TRAGEDY OF VAJONT

THERE ARE
THOUSANDS
DEAD

IT WAS A
MASSACRE
THAT COULD
HAVE BEEN
AVOIDED



PREVIOUS DAM FAILURES: VAJONT


Location: Italy

Completed: 1960

Failure: October 9, 1963

Deaths: 2,600

- Massive upstream landslide caused overtopping.
- Dam did not fail.




<https://damfailures.org/case-study/vajont-dam-italy-1963/>



https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vajont_Dam/

PREVIOUS DAM FAILURES: VAJONT

- Volume of slide more than twice volume of reservoir. Landslide was 400 times larger than previous landslide.
- Risks due to scale and magnitude of landslide not recognized.
- Hazards can exist, even if a structure is considered safe and does not fail.
- 1.2 mile landslide



a. Vaiont Dam, b. Section, c. Landslide, d. Scarp, e.&f. Longarone before and after

PREVIOUS DAM FAILURES: VAJONT

"Any damsite investigation should include a detailed study of the proposed reservoir slopes. If old slides or areas susceptible to sliding are identified, a detailed evaluation of their relative stability under reservoir conditions should be required. The lesson afforded by (Vajont) need not be relearned by another generation."
– Hendron and Patton, 1986



<https://www.geotech.hr/en/vajont-a-tragedy-that-killed-more-than-2000-people/>

The AP logo consists of the letters 'AP' in a bold, black, sans-serif font, positioned above a horizontal red bar. The background of the entire image is a black and white photograph of a large dam structure, with the Malpas Dam visible in the distance. The text is overlaid on this background.

AP

THE TRAGEDY OF THE DAM

MALPASSET DAM BURSTS

**NETT
IING**

PREVIOUS DAM FAILURES: MALPASSET


Location: France

Completed: 1954

Failure: December 2, 1959


Deaths: 421

- Left abutment failed due to increased uplift pressures.



PREVIOUS DAM FAILURES: MALPASSET

- Double-curvature arch structure spanned the Reyran River.
- At time of completion in 1954, thinnest arch dam of its height (218 feet) with a maximum thickness of 22.2 feet.
- Designed by Andre Coyne with the primary goal of optimizing its shape and thinning its structure.
- Little effort devoted to analyzing the geology of the foundation.



<https://doi.org/10.1144/qjegh2018-186>

PREVIOUS DAM FAILURES: MALPASSET






- Foundation deficiencies and human oversight led to the instability issues at the Malpasset Dam.
- Fault discovered downstream of the dam.
- Foliation pattern of the foundation led to increased uplift as dam was loaded.
- Uplift pressure at left abutment dislodged the thrust block.
- Failure of abutment led to the ultimate failure of dam.



https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Malpasset_Dam

HOW AND FOR WHAT ARE DAMS ANALYZED?

HOW AND FOR WHAT ARE DAMS ANALYZED?



HOW AND FOR WHAT ARE DAMS ANALYZED?




— BUREAU OF —
RECLAMATION

United States Bureau of Reclamation



Federal Energy Regulatory Commission



**US Army Corps
of Engineers®**

United States Army Corps of Engineers






HOW AND FOR WHAT ARE DAMS ANALYZED?



BUREAU OF RECLAMATION



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HOW AND FOR WHAT ARE DAMS ANALYZED?

TYPICAL LOADS ON A DAM

GRAVITY

INTERNAL
WATER
PRESSURE

SILT PRESSURE

ICE PRESSURE

EXTERNAL
WATER
PRESSURE

TEMPERATURE


EARTHQUAKE

GATES OR
APPURTENANT
STRUCTURES

HOW AND FOR WHAT ARE DAMS ANALYZED?

Usual Load Combination


- Gravity
- Reservoir
- Tailwater
- Sediment
- Uplift



HOW AND FOR WHAT ARE DAMS ANALYZED?

Unusual Load Combination


- Gravity
- Reservoir - Flood
- Tailwater
- Sediment
- Uplift



HOW AND FOR WHAT ARE DAMS ANALYZED?

Extreme Load Combination


- Gravity
- Reservoir
- Tailwater
- Sediment
- Uplift
- Reservoir added mass
- Earthquake



HOW AND FOR WHAT ARE DAMS ANALYZED?

Post-Earthquake Combination

- Gravity
- Reservoir
- Tailwater
- Sediment
- Uplift



BASIC CONCRETE DAM FAILURE MODES

BASIC CONCRETE DAM FAILURE MODES

OVERSTRESSING

COMPUTED STRESSES < ALLOWABLE STRENGTH

ROTATIONAL AND SLIDING STABILITY

SLIDING FACTOR OF SAFETY

BASIC CONCRETE DAM FAILURE MODES

DEVELOPING A FAILURE MODE

INITIATING EVENT



PROGRESSION




FAILURE

BASIC CONCRETE DAM FAILURE MODES

DAM INTERNAL INSTABILITY (OVERSTRESSING)


- Hydrologic event up to and including the PMF event occurs.
- Inflows into the reservoir are greater than the outflow capacity causing an increase in the reservoir level.
- Higher reservoir level results in increased load on the dam which cause an increase in the stresses in the dam.
- Increased stresses are greater than the capacity of the concrete, resulting in crack development.
- Uplift develops within crack, resulting in crack propagation.
- Driving force is greater than the capacity resulting in instability along the cracked section causing breach and uncontrolled release of the reservoir.



BASIC CONCRETE DAM FAILURE MODES

DAM EXTERNAL INSTABILITY


- Hydrologic event up to and including the PMF event occurs.
- Inflows into the reservoir are greater than the outflow capacity causing an increase in the reservoir level.
- Higher reservoir level results in increased load on the dam which cause separation along the dam/foundation interface.
- Separation along the interface at the upstream heel results in an increase in the uplift pressure.
- Driving force along the interface is greater than the capacity, and results in instability along the interface causing breach and uncontrolled release of the reservoir.



BASIC CONCRETE DAM FAILURE MODES

DAM OVERTOPPING

- Hydrologic event up to and including the PMF event occurs.
- Inflows into the reservoir are greater than the outflow capacity causing an increase in the reservoir level.
- Higher reservoir level overtops crest of dam and overtopping jet impacts downstream foundation rock.
- Streampower from overtopping jet is greater than erodibility index of the rock abutments, resulting in scour.
- Rock scour progresses beneath the dam, resulting in reduced shear capacity.
- Driving force is greater than the capacity, and results in instability and uncontrolled release of the reservoir.



BASIC CONCRETE DAM FAILURE MODES

BENEFITS OF THE PFMA PROCESS



UNDERSTANDING OF
HOW THE DAM
FUNCTIONS AND
COULD FAIL



RESULTS HELP DEVELOP
DAM SAFETY PROGRAM



LEARN INTIMATE
DETAILS OF THE DAM



IDENTIFY KNOWLEDGE
GAPS AND MISSING
ANALYSES



OPERATION AND
MAINTENANCE



SURVEILLANCE AND
MONITORING

BASIC CONCRETE DAM FAILURE MODES

SURVEILLANCE AND MONITORING



DEFINES WHAT NEEDS TO BE MONITORED



PERFORMANCE PARAMETERS



RISK REDUCTION MEASURES



IDENTIFY UNKNOWN FLAWS

BASIC CONCRETE DAM FAILURE MODES

What PFMs are required to provide a full understanding of all the threats to the safety of my project?



ANALYSIS OPTIONS

ANALYSIS OPTIONS

Gannett Fleming SUBJECT: Sliding Stability SHEET NO. 6 OF 6
 BY: DATE CHD BY: DATE JOB NO.

Sliding Stability
 $Q = CA + \sum F_{\text{up}} - \sum F_{\text{down}}$
 $\sum F_{\text{up}} = 27.6 - 0.86 - 0 + 12.6 k$
 $\sum F_{\text{down}} = 5.1 k - 0 = 5.1 k$
 $Q = \frac{12.86 \text{ k} - 5.1 k}{5.1 k} = 3.02$

Normal
 $\sum F_x = -27.6 - 1.09 - 7.3 + 27.7$
 $\sum F_y = 11.0645 - 3.071 = 7.97$
 $Q = \frac{11.21 \text{ k} - 1.91}{7.97} = 1.41$ Pass

Stresses - PMP
 $e = \frac{\sum M_x}{\sum F_y} = \frac{-573.3 + 62.53 - 95.45 - 10}{11.21} = -49.35$
 $M_{\text{min}} = \sum F_y \left(\frac{B}{2} - e \right) = 11.21 (24.375/2 - 49.35) = -125.19$
 $M_{\text{max}} = \sum F_y \left(\frac{B}{2} + e \right) = 11.21 (24.375/2 + 49.35) = 17.17$
 $M_c = \sum F_y \left(\frac{B}{2} - 18.35 \right) = 17.06 (24.375/2 - 18.35) = 17.06$
 $M_{\text{top}} = \sum F_y \left(\frac{B}{2} + 12.86 \right) = 11.21 (24.375/2 + 12.86) = 27.3732$

No Tension : No Crack : Stable

Gannett Fleming SUBJECT: Sliding SHEET NO. 3 OF 6
 BY: DATE CHD BY: DATE JOB NO.

NWS = 3048.5' BASE EL = 2994.75' = NTW (Assumed no tailwater)
 PMP = 3019.5' PTW = 3004.7 R

Stresses - PMP
 $M_{\text{min}} = 5108.2 (11.75/2) = 27.08$
 $M_{\text{top}} = 12181.5 (11.35/2) = 112.519$
 $M_{\text{min}} = 851.375 (27.375/2 + 9.5) = 12.81$
 $M_{\text{top}} = 851.375 (27.375) + 750(27.375) = 28.71$
 $M_{\text{min}} = 27.08 (21.11 - 18.35) = 57.375$
 $M_{\text{top}} = 27.08 (21.11 - 18.35) = 57.375$

No Tension : No Crack : Stable

Gannett Fleming SUBJECT: Big Rock Gravity Analysis SHEET NO. 1 OF 6
 BY: DATE CHD BY: DATE JOB NO.

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Clipboard Font Alignment Number Styles Cells

Q75

Cross-Section Geometry			Section Slopes, Upstream and Downstream Face		
Point	Elevation	Notes	Slope	Elevation	Notes
1	405.000	Top of Dam	1:1	405.000	1:1
2	405.000	Top of Dam	1:1	405.000	1:1
3	405.000	Top of Dam	1:1	405.000	1:1
4	405.000	Top of Dam	1:1	405.000	1:1
5	405.000	Top of Dam	1:1	405.000	1:1
6	405.000	Top of Dam	1:1	405.000	1:1
7	405.000	Top of Dam	1:1	405.000	1:1
8	405.000	Top of Dam	1:1	405.000	1:1
9	405.000	Top of Dam	1:1	405.000	1:1
10	405.000	Top of Dam	1:1	405.000	1:1

Uplift used in Sliding Analysis

Parameter	Value
Uplift	0.00
Pressure	0.00
Pressure @ Facility Drain	0.00
Pressure @ Seepage	0.00



Sliding Stability: F.S. = 1.43 Resultant Location: 47% (Check the box)

Crack Length: 0.00 feet Percent Cracked: 0%

Understanding the Dam Basics:
 The role of the structural engineer in Concrete Dams




ANALYSIS OPTIONS




EXAMPLES: PULLING ALL THE PIECES TOGETHER

EXAMPLE #1







EXAMPLE #2



Understanding the Dam Basics:
The role of the structural engineer in Concrete Dams

EXAMPLE #3



Questions & Answers



THANK YOU!

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